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The interocular suppression technique termed continuous ﬂash suppression (CFS) has
become an immensely popular tool for investigating visual processing outside of aware-
ness.The emerging picture from studies using CFS is that extensive processing of a visual
stimulus, including its semantic and affective content, occurs despite suppression from
awareness of that stimulus by CFS. However, the current implementation of CFS in many
studies examining processing outside of awareness has several drawbacks that may be
improved upon for future studies using CFS. In this paper, we address some of those
shortcomings, particularly ones that affect the assessment of unawareness during CFS,
and ones to do with the use of “visible” conditions that are often included as a comparison
to a CFS condition. We also discuss potential biases in stimulus processing as a result of
spatial attention and feature-selective suppression. We suggest practical guidelines that
minimize the effects of those limitations in using CFS to study visual processing outside
of awareness.
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INTRODUCTION
During our waking hours our eyes provide us with more sensory
information thanwe canpossibly process in detail, andonly a small
proportion of this information reaches awareness. At the same
time, it would be adaptive for our brains to continue monitoring
potentially relevant sensory signals, even those that do not culmi-
nate in a conscious experience. Indeed, several lines of research
suggest that unperceived visual information can inﬂuence per-
ceptual and cognitive operations, without our awareness (reviews
by Bridgeman, 1992; Merikle and Daneman, 1998; Goodale and
Milner, 2004).
While the notion of processing outside of awareness1 is intrigu-
ing, it remains one of the most controversial issues in psychology,
and for decades the research area has been fraught with method-
ological and theoretical challenges (e.g., Eriksen, 1960; Marcel,
1983; Holender, 1986; Merikle and Daneman, 1998). Yet at
the same time, psychophysical techniques for rendering stim-
uli perceptually invisible continue to be developed, providing
researchers with an ever more varied array of experimental tools
for investigating processing outside of awareness (review by Kim
and Blake, 2005). Some of these tools exploit the reﬂexive sup-
pression that occurs when different images are simultaneously
1We prefer the phrase “processing outside of awareness” to “unconscious process-
ing” because the latter could be confused to imply that we are focusing on neural
correlates of consciousness. Our focus is exclusively on the extent to which a visual
stimulus remains effective when it is erased temporarily from visual awareness.
presented to the two eyes, i.e., dichoptic stimulation. An advan-
tage of dichoptic stimulation techniques over other approaches
is that an observer can monocularly view one of any variety
of salient stimuli, yet remain unaware of its presence for sec-
onds at a time. Variants of this dichoptic stimulation technique
include binocular rivalry (Wheatstone, 1838; Breese, 1909), ﬂash
suppression (Wolfe, 1984), generalized ﬂash suppression (Wilke
et al., 2003), ﬂicker-swap rivalry (Logothetis et al., 1996), and
binocular switch suppression (Arnold et al., 2008). One version
that has recently become popular as a means for erasing visual
stimuli from awareness is called continuous ﬂash suppression
(CFS; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005), and it is the focus of our
paper.
While traditional binocular rivalry typically involves two dis-
plays of roughly similar “potency” (e.g., comparable motion
content and luminance contrast) being presented to the two eyes,
CFS critically involves a much less balanced design. During CFS
one eye views rapidly ﬂashing contour-rich patterns of high con-
trast (sometimes referred to as dynamic Mondrians), while the
other views a stimulus that is typically stationary and of moder-
ate contrast. The ever-changing patterns viewed by one eye cause
periods of invisibility of the unchanging stimulus viewed by the
other eye, and these periods can last for dozens of seconds, about
10 times longer than suppression producedwith traditional binoc-
ular rivalry (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005). CFS has several attractive
features. For instance, anecdotal observations by several labora-
tories indicate that the suppressive effect of CFS can engulf even
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relatively large stimuli presented to the other eye, stimuli that yield
pronounced piecemeal suppression when viewed during binocu-
lar rivalry (e.g., Meenes, 1930; Blake et al., 1992). In addition,
with CFS complete invisibility can reliably be induced from the
very onset of stimulus presentation, in contrast to the situation
during traditional binocular rivalry where the initially suppressed
stimulus can be unpredictable (e.g., Carter and Cavanagh, 2007;
Song and Yao, 2009) and subsequent ﬂuctuations in suppres-
sion transpire unpredictably between the two rival stimuli (e.g.,
Fox and Herrmann, 1967). While masking and attentional blink
paradigms, like CFS, allow control over the onset timing of invisi-
bility, those two techniques are constrained by allowing only very
brief stimulus durations (Kim and Blake, 2005). Furthermore,
in comparison to paradigms like crowding and motion induced
blindness, perceptual suppression with CFS is less susceptible to
the effects of unstable ﬁxation and eye movements (Kim and
Blake, 2005). Given these properties of the perceptual suppres-
sion induced by CFS, it is not surprising that CFS has been quickly
and widely adopted as a tool for investigating visual processing
outside of awareness.
When looking at ﬁndings from studies using CFS, the evidence
for stimulus processing outside of awareness seems compelling.
As reviewed below, CFS suppression does not appear to pre-
clude neural processing, either of low-level stimulus features,
or of abstract stimulus properties with dedicated representa-
tions at more advanced stages of the visual system. In the case
of low-level features, the notion that these are registered out-
side of awareness has also been conﬁrmed using a number of
other perceptual suppression techniques, including traditional
binocular rivalry. With regard to more advanced stages of anal-
ysis, however, the picture from the literature as a whole is
worth revisiting, given that there is little evidence for high-level
processing during suppression phases of traditional binocular
rivalry which, ironically, is reputed to create weaker interoc-
ular suppression than does CFS (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005;
Tsuchiya et al., 2006).
In addition to this apparent discrepancy between CFS and tra-
ditional binocular rivalry, another motivation behind this review
is our conviction that CFS experiments into processing outside of
awareness, although often straightforward in their basic idea, are
surprisingly complicated, and their design and interpretation are
fraught with subtleties. Careful consideration of these subtleties
is particularly important because work that uses CFS for this pur-
pose may have a signiﬁcant impact on current theories of neural
information processing, emotional processing, and psychopathol-
ogy. Indeed, the utilization of CFS has already found its way into
clinical research (Sterzer et al., 2011; Sylvers et al., 2011; Yang et al.,
2011), and so it is imperative that CFS be used wisely to study
processing outside of awareness.
The objective of our paper is to recommend practical guide-
lines for researchers interested in exploring this technique as a
means of investigating stimulus processing outside of awareness.
Our recommendations are centered on answering four primary
questions:
(1) What are suitable paradigms to use with CFS to study
processing outside of awareness?
(2) What are the optimal ways to determine whether a stimulus is
genuinely invisible?
(3) What are effective methods for gaging the speciﬁcity and
strength of stimulus processing outside of awareness?
(4) What are factors that inﬂuence the robustness of stimulus-
driven effects under CFS?
We draw attention to several considerations that should be
made when answering each of these questions. For the ﬁrst
question, we review the common approaches used to study pro-
cessing outside of awareness with CFS. For the second question,
we reexamine the methods used to assess observers’ perception
during CFS suppression, since evidence for processing outside of
awareness rests critically on demonstrating absence of awareness.
This is particularly pertinent to behavioral priming and adap-
tation paradigms as well as neurophysiological studies that use
CFS to examine stimulus processing outside of awareness. For
the third question, we discuss the application of “visible” condi-
tions used to provide a comparison for CFS conditions in order to
determine the speciﬁcity and strength of stimulus-driven effects
during CFS. For the fourth question, we discuss mechanisms that
can potentially modulate stimulus processing under CFS such
as those engaged in attention and feature-selective suppression.
Following the discussion of each issue, we propose strategies for
effectively resolving these questions and for minimizing method-
ological confounds in using CFS to study processing outside of
awareness.
From the outset we acknowledge that the matter of “process-
ing outside of awareness” is fraught with controversy, with sharp
points of disagreement within the ﬁeld. Our views are unlikely
to be received without question by all who are interested in this
issue. We do hope that our views can advance the conversation in
a constructive way.
WHAT ARE SUITABLE PARADIGMS TO USE WITH CFS TO STUDY
PROCESSING OUTSIDE OF AWARENESS?
In this section,we review research that has usedCFS to askwhether
visual processing can transpire outside of awareness (Figure 1).
We focus on three types of behavioral effects that have been
investigated to tackle this question: (1) adaptation aftereffects of
suppressed stimuli, (2) priming effects evoked by suppressed stim-
uli, and (3) dependence of suppression duration on the nature of
the suppressed stimulus. In each case we will also brieﬂy address
how recent CFS ﬁndings compare to previous ﬁndings obtained
using traditional binocular rivalry.
Adaptation aftereffects with CFS
Several CFS studies have utilized the well-established adapta-
tion paradigm in which exposure to a stimulus gives rise to
visual aftereffects (Figure 1A). A variety of different afteref-
fects exist, each speciﬁcally affecting detection or appearance
of particular stimulus attributes, ranging from low-level prop-
erties such as orientation (e.g., the tilt aftereffect) to high-level
features such as face identity and facial expression. Aftereffects
have been widely used psychophysically to isolate and probe
neural mechanisms involved in processing particular stimulus
attributes (Mollon, 1974; Thompson and Burr, 2009). One
way to investigate the extent of stimulus encoding outside of
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FIGURE 1 | Schematics of three frequently employed test procedures for
assessing the effect of interocular suppression induced by CFS on visual
processing. In all three panels, time runs from the top to the bottom.
(A) Visual adaptation stimulus (a male face in this example) is presented to
one eye for a duration ordinarily sufﬁcient to generate a visual aftereffect (shift
in perceived gender of neutral test face viewed following adaptation). Is the
aftereffect attenuated or abolished consequent to suppression of awareness
of the male face by the CFS array viewed by the other eye?The adapting face
is turned on gradually over several hundred milliseconds to avoid abrupt
transients that can brieﬂy perturb suppression (Photographs courtesy of Sang
Chul Chong, Yonsei University). (B) Visual priming stimulus is brieﬂy
presented to one eye while the other eye views a CFS array. Does this prime
stimulus inﬂuence accuracy and/or speed of performance on a subsequent
object categorization task? (C) bCSF trial where a stimulus presented to one
eye remains present until the observer has sufﬁcient information to specify
the location of the target (in this example a 2AFC detection task). In one
variant of this b-CFS task, the observer is simply asked to indicate when the
monocular stimulus achieves dominance. With b-CFS the experimenter is
usually interested in learning whether provocative (e.g., fearful face) or
atypical (e.g., inverted face) stimuli yield signiﬁcantly different
times-to-dominance compared to putatively neutral versions of the same
class of stimuli (Face © Bantosh/ CC-BY-SA-3.0).
awareness is to determine whether aftereffects can be induced
and, by inference, whether neural adaptation occurs, when
the inducing stimulus is suppressed from awareness during the
adaptation period. If full-strength adaptation aftereffects can be
induced despite perceptual suppression, it stands to reason that
the neural events responsible for adaptation transpire regard-
less of observers’ awareness of the inducing stimulus. On the
other hand, these neural events may be affected by suppres-
sion, resulting in aftereffects that are weakened or even abolished
(Blake et al., 2006). Considering that induction of strong after-
effects typically requires longer periods of visual adaptation,
CFS – because of the enduring suppression it produces – is par-
ticularly suitable for testing adaptation aftereffects of invisible
stimuli.
In some cases when this strategy was applied with CFS to sup-
press an adapting stimulus, CFS effectively weakened, but not
necessarily abolished, the resulting adaptation aftereffect. This is
true for aftereffects speciﬁc to stimulus properties often ascribed
to early visual processing, including spatial phase (van Boxtel
et al., 2010b), orientation (Kanai et al., 2006; Bahrami et al., 2008),
motion (Maruya et al., 2008; Kaunitz et al., 2011a), and con-
trast (Shin et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2010b). At the same time,
aftereffects thought to result from adaptation within “high-level”
stages of visual processing are typically abolished entirely by sup-
pression – examples in this category include aftereffects induced
by adaptation to complex motion (Maruya et al., 2008; Kaunitz
et al., 2011a), to curvature (Sweeny et al., 2011) and to faces spe-
ciﬁc for race (Amihai et al., 2011), for gender (Shin et al., 2009;
Amihai et al., 2011), for gaze (Stein et al., 2012a), for face shape
(Stein and Sterzer, 2011), and for emotional expression (Yang
et al., 2010b; but see Adams et al., 2010). The attenuation of
early visual adaptation and the complete disruption of high-level
visual adaptation during CFS are fairly consistent with results
obtained using the adaptation aftereffect paradigm in conjunc-
tion with traditional binocular rivalry (see Blake and He, 2005 for
review).
Studies of adaptation aftereffects clearly demonstrate that CFS
interferes with the neural analysis of diverse stimulus attributes.
Moreover, if suppression greatly inﬂuences encoding of funda-
mental visual properties such as orientation and contrast, one
could reasonably assume that it would similarly affect encoding
of more complex image properties that are deﬁned by combi-
nations of these features. However, other lines of research suggest
that certain classes of complex properties continue to be processed
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despite being blocked from visual awareness by CFS. One source
of support is evidence of priming effects from stimuli suppressed
with CFS, the topic we turn to next.
Priming effects with CFS
Subliminal priming procedures are among the most established
and most popular techniques used to investigate visual process-
ing outside of awareness (Figure 1B). These procedures build on
traditional priming paradigms that demonstrate improved perfor-
mance on tasks that involve a target stimulus, when presentation
of that stimulus is preceded by presentation of a (prime) stim-
ulus that shares physical or conceptual (semantic) characteristics
of the target stimulus (Marcel, 1983; reviews by Snodgrass et al.,
2004; Kouider and Dehaene, 2007). When the prime stimulus
is suppressed from awareness but nonetheless engenders a prim-
ing effect on the subsequently viewed target, the presumption is
that the stimulus feature or characteristic responsible for prim-
ing has been neurally registered despite the phenomenological
suppression of the prime.
In various studies using CFS as the agent of suppression, invis-
ible primes remained effective on tasks where the target was
identical to the prime (Faivre et al., 2012), on tasks where the
targets were semantically or categorically related to the prime
(Almeida et al., 2008, 2010; Zabelina et al., 2013; but see Kang
et al., 2011; Sakuraba et al., 2012), and on tasks where the tar-
gets were similar in their numerosity (Bahrami et al., 2010). To
give one speciﬁc example, Almeida et al. (2008) presented images
of objects drawn from different categories (i.e., animals, tools,
vehicles) as prime and target stimuli, and prime stimuli were ren-
dered invisible owing to CFS. Observers’ reaction times (RTs) in
categorizing targets were reduced when these were objects in the
tool category that were preceded by an invisible prime that was
also a tool, but this priming effect was not found for the other
object categories. This category-speciﬁc priming effect suggests
that objects in the tool category may be preferentially processed
without awareness. Another set of ﬁndings demonstrated that
emotional expressions presented underCFSbiased observers’pref-
erence toward subsequently presented neutral stimuli (Anderson
et al., 2012; Almeida et al., 2013; but see Faivre et al., 2012; de
Zilva et al., 2013). These results indicate that stimuli presented
outside of awareness can undergo analysis speciﬁc to relatively
abstract properties like numerosity, object category and emo-
tional content, thus leading to observable perceptual or decisional
biases.
Unlike the situation for the literature on aftereffects and CFS,
results on priming and CFS seem at odds with the pattern of
ﬁndings reported when traditional binocular rivalry is used to
manipulate awareness. In contrast to the CFS ﬁndings described
above, both semantic priming effects with words and repetition
priming effects with pictorial images were found to be completely
abolished when prime stimuli were suppressed under binocular
rivalry (Zimba and Blake, 1983; Cave et al., 1998). Considering
that CFS is a stronger form of interocular suppression than binoc-
ular rivalry (Tsuchiya et al., 2006) one would, if anything, expect
the effectiveness of a suppressed prime stimulus to be even weaker
in the case of CFS. The source of this discrepancy betweenCFS and
binocular rivalry priming studies has yet to be elucidated, but one
factor to keep in mind pertains to the temporal buildup of sup-
pression produced by CFS. Tsuchiya et al. (2006) found that the
potency of suppression is initially relatively weak and builds up
with successive mask presentations, plateauing after about 500 ms
(i.e., the appearance of ﬁve successive masks). Therefore suppres-
sion may be shallow at shorter presentation durations of the CFS
display, which happen to be adopted by some priming studies
(Almeida et al., 2008, 2010, 2013; Sakuraba et al., 2012).
Emergence from suppression with CFS
The third and ﬁnal line of research discussed here that utilizes CFS
in investigating processing outside of awareness entails measur-
ing the amount of time that a stimulus remains suppressed under
CFS (Figure 1C). The assumption in these studies is that par-
ticular stimuli or categories of stimuli that emerge more quickly
from suppression, relative to other stimuli, are being registered
despite being suppressed owing to CFS. Unlike adaptation and
priming paradigms in which stimulus awareness and behavioral
effects driven by processes outside of awareness are measured
independently, the “breaking continuous ﬂash suppression” (b-
CFS) technique provides a measure of stimulus awareness with
which one may be able to infer processing outside of awareness.
As a result of this property of b-CFS, there exists disagreement
in the literature regarding the extent to which b-CFS actually
provides a valid measure of unconscious processing (Stein et al.,
2011b).
Breaking continuous ﬂash suppression is based on a hallmark
characteristic of binocular rivalry: stronger stimuli (e.g., high
contrast stimulus) remain suppressed for shorter periods of time
(Levelt, 1965). Using this technique, Jiang et al. (2007) presented
either upright or inverted face stimuli to an observer’s suppressed
eye while a CFS mask was presented to the other eye, and they
measured the time it took for the observer to report the loca-
tion of the face as it emerged from suppression. Upright faces
were detected faster than inverted faces (also see Yang et al., 2007;
Stein et al., 2011b), implying that upright faces were effectively
stronger stimuli than inverted faces. Jiang et al. (2007) interpreted
this result to mean that invisible upright faces were processed at
the level of object category, given that basic stimulus features do
not vary importantly with variations in face orientation whereas
face recognition is highly susceptible to face orientation. This
ﬁnding has inspired others to investigate processing outside of
awareness of social and emotional cues of faces using the same
CFS technique. These studies have found that faces with fearful
expressions tend to break suppression more quickly than other
facial expressions (Yang et al., 2007; Tsuchiya et al., 2009; Sterzer
et al., 2011; Gray et al., 2013; Stein et al., 2014), as do faces with
eyes that gaze directly at the observer (Stein et al., 2011a) and
faces judged as trustworthy or as non-domineering (Stewart et al.,
2012).
Breaking continuous ﬂash suppression has also been used to
examine whether other high-level properties, including lexical
and semantic information, are processed outside of awareness.
For instance, images of morphemes that are part of one’s
native language tend to emerge from suppression faster than
images of unfamiliar, foreign words (Jiang et al., 2007). Sim-
ilarly, an initially suppressed word breaks suppression more
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quickly if that word is preceded by a semantically related vis-
ible word (Costello et al., 2009). The affective connotation of
a word or phrase may also modulate the duration of suppres-
sion under CFS (Yang and Yeh, 2010; Sklar et al., 2012). Finally,
the time to break from suppression is also reduced for stim-
uli that are semantically congruent with concurrently presented
stimuli delivered through another sensory modality – this bisen-
sory facilitation is found with hearing (Alsius and Munhall,
2013; Lupyan and Ward, 2013) and with olfaction (Zhou et al.,
2010). Overall, the existing evidence implies that with b-CFS,
semantic information of an invisible stimulus may be encoded
and, consequently, strengthen the neural signals associated with
that stimulus, empowering it to emerge more quickly from
suppression.
Again we can compare these results obtained using b-CFS
with those found using traditional binocular rivalry. Binocular
rivalry ﬁndings are similar in showing that cognitively salient
(i.e., meaningful) stimuli exhibit predominance over less mean-
ingful stimuli (Walker, 1978; review by Blake and Logothetis,
2002). For example, recognizable ﬁgures (Yu and Blake, 1992),
familiar images (Engel, 1956; Losciuto and Hartley, 1963), and
emotional faces (e.g., Alpers and Gerdes, 2007; Bannerman
et al., 2008) enjoy prolonged perceptual dominance. Note, how-
ever, an important difference between the measures of “time to
break from suppression” during b-CFS and predominance during
binocular rivalry. Because binocular rivalry involves alternat-
ing perception of both eyes’ images, changes in predominance
can often be explained by altered processing of the perceptu-
ally dominant stimulus rather than any processing occurring in
the suppression phase of rivalry. Indeed it is well-established
that, for instance, attention to the perceptually dominant stim-
ulus increases its dominance durations (Lack, 1978; Ooi and
He, 1999; Meng and Tong, 2004; Chong et al., 2005; Hugrass
and Crewther, 2012). In this sense, the time a stimulus takes
to break initial suppression during b-CFS can provide a more
unequivocal answer than can binocular rivalry, depending on
the question being asked. It is also worth noting that binoc-
ular rivalry studies using test probe techniques often rely on
stimulus discrimination (e.g., Ling and Blake, 2009) or recog-
nition (e.g., Alais and Melcher, 2007) to gage the depth of
suppression whereas b-CFS studies tend to use detection or
stimulus localization. Different tasks could contribute to appar-
ent differences in interpretation of results from rivalry and
b-CFS.
Recommendations
Adaptation, priming, and b-CFS are all adapted from well-
established techniques in studying stimulus processing. Prim-
ing and b-CFS techniques may be suitable for investigating
both perceptual and higher-level cognitive processes outside
of awareness, whereas visual adaptation may be optimal for
examining predominantly low-level visual processes and some
complex ones as well (i.e., face processing). Before deciding
which technique to use, experimenters should also consider the
shortcomings of the current implementation of each technique,
which are discussed throughout the remaining parts of this
paper.
WHAT ARE THE OPTIMAL WAYS TO DETERMINE WHETHER A
STIMULUS IS GENUINELY INVISIBLE?
As with any technique used to study subliminal perception, CFS
studies that report performance or physiological measures indica-
tive of stimulus processing outside of awareness must demonstrate
that the stimuli were genuinely suppressed from awareness. In
priming and adaptation paradigms, measures of awareness are
assessed independently of the measure of processing outside of
awareness (i.e., priming effect and aftereffect). In contrast, b-CFS
provides an index of awareness to infer stimulus processing out-
side of awareness, and so this section does not pertain to the
b-CFS paradigm. In establishing the absence of awareness, some
researchers advocate subjective measures (e.g., Cheesman and
Merikle, 1986) whereas others argue for the use of objective mea-
sures (e.g., Holender, 1986) to verify observers’ unawareness of
stimuli suppressed by CFS.
A very popular way of obtaining a subjective measure of aware-
ness in the context of CFS experiments is to ask participants to
report any occasion when they perceive another image besides the
CFS suppressor. These subjective reports are then used to dis-
card trials where suppression fails (e.g., Kanai et al., 2006; Maruya
et al., 2008). Rather than relying on binary judgments of visibility
(“yes” versus “no”), there are other, more nuanced ways to cull
visible from invisible trials (Sandberg et al., 2010; see Hesselmann,
2013 for review). For instance, observers can rate the quality of
their visual experience on a graded scale, such as the perceptual
awareness scale (PAS), which includes multiple response options
ranging from “no visual experience at all” on one extreme, to “a
clear and complete visual experience” on the other (Ramsoy and
Overgaard, 2004; see Ludwig et al., 2013 for a CFS study using
PAS). In some approaches, reports of subjective experience are
supplemented by asking observers to provide conﬁdence ratings
of these reports (e.g., Cheesman and Merikle, 1986; Kunimoto
et al., 2001). For instance, in one recently introduced form of
conﬁdence rating termed post-decision wagering, observers’ con-
ﬁdence levels are represented by the amount of money they are
willing to bet on the accuracy of their subjective judgments (Per-
saud et al., 2007). The method should in principle motivate people
both to respond in a bias-free manner and to accurately express
their conﬁdence level (Persaud et al., 2007; Schurger and Sher,
2008; but see Clifford et al., 2008). Another approach to inves-
tigating awareness using conﬁdence ratings aims to characterize
the nature of invisibility on trials where observers report seeing
no stimulus, by combining conﬁdence ratings on these trials with
signal detection theory (Kanai et al., 2010). Only a few studies
have applied conﬁdence rating methods to study stimulus analysis
during CFS (Bahrami et al., 2008; Sterzer et al., 2008; Raio et al.,
2012).
In other published studies, a 2-alternative categorization task
has been used to infer the extent to which an observer is aware
of a stimulus viewed together with CFS. In two versions of this
approach, observers are instructed to either classify the suppressed
stimulus into one of two object categories (e.g., tool versus animal;
e.g., Almeida et al., 2008; Arnold et al., 2008; Sterzer et al., 2008;
Kaunitz et al., 2011b; Raio et al., 2012) or to discriminate the sup-
pressed stimulus from a grid-scrambled version of that stimulus
(Fang and He, 2005; Jiang and He, 2006; Jiang et al., 2006, 2009).
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Because such tasks require the observer to make a report follow-
ing CFS presentation, and because many paradigms also involve
another behavioral report at that time, these categorization tasks
are often implemented in a separate “control” experiment rather
than as part of themain experiment, to avoid dual task demands. If
performance is not signiﬁcantly different from chance in the con-
trol experiment, investigators conclude that observers were also
unaware of the stimuli presented under CFS during the condition
of interest.
Potential concerns
Regardless how awareness is assessed when using CFS, there are
several considerations to keep in mind. A concern that can arise
in the context of subjective awareness measures is that of deci-
sion criterion. Speciﬁcally, when asking an observer whether he
or she perceives a stimulus, a negative response may reﬂect a con-
servative criterion rather than lack of awareness of the stimulus
(Eriksen, 1960; Holender, 1986). Although this point applies gen-
erally to experiments that measure awareness subjectively, it may
be particularly pressing in the case of CFS experiments, given
that a stimulus pitted against a dynamic CFS display may partially
break suppression but rarely overcomes suppression completely
such that it achieves exclusive dominance. There exists, in other
words, a potentially confusing “gray zone” between seeing noth-
ing and, then, experiencing a clean break from suppression. In
line with this notion, accruing evidence demonstrates that visual
awareness of complex stimuli does, indeed, vary in a graded fash-
ion, both under visual masking (e.g., Overgaard et al., 2006; Seth
et al., 2008; Sandberg et al., 2010) and underCFS (Kang et al., 2011;
Mudrik et al., 2013).
The possibility of partial visibility during CFS is an impor-
tant concern in the context of dichotomous subjective report
tasks, given that partially visible stimuli that may not elicit a “yes”
response in such a task, are likely to nevertheless affect exper-
imental measures. Visual masking studies have shown that the
strength of semantic priming correlates with the degree of per-
ception of prime stimuli (e.g., Purcell et al., 1983; Kouider and
Dupoux, 2004; Nolan and Caramazza, 2013; review by Kouider
and Dehaene, 2007; see also Kouider et al., 2010). To give an exam-
ple, Kouider and Dupoux (2004) assessed observers’ awareness
using tasks that tapped into different stages of stimulus process-
ing and observed semantic priming by partially visible words in
which observers could accurately discriminate letters yet without
recognizing the words as a whole. When observers could nei-
ther recognize the words nor discriminate letters, indicating that
the words were fully masked, semantic priming was completely
abolished.
Objective measures of awareness, in turn, are not free from
drawbacks either. Both objective and subjective measures have
been critiqued on statistical grounds (Rouder et al., 2007; review
by Hesselmann, 2013). Speciﬁcally, experimenters who use a yes–
no, detection, or discrimination task as their index of awareness
may ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference between an observer’s objec-
tive performance and chance level performance, and then may
falsely accept the null hypothesis that observers’ performance is
equivalent to chance levels, when in reality the experiment is
underpowered to detect a reliable difference (Altman and Bland,
1995). Second, whereas the ﬁrst point suggests that objective
measures can be overly liberal in identifying situations as lacking
awareness, objective measures have also been argued to be overly
conservative. That is, above-chance performance on discrimina-
tion tasks could in some cases be attributed to inﬂuences that are
not accompanied by phenomenal experience, and that may there-
fore be classiﬁed as outside of awareness (Cheesman and Merikle,
1986; Merikle and Daneman, 1998). In such cases there is, there-
fore, a dissociation between subjective and objective measures of
awareness (Stoerig and Cowey, 1997; Kanai et al., 2010). As we will
discuss below, this is certainly not the only dissociation between
different measures of awareness.
Several additional concerns arise from the fact, mentioned
above, that performance levels on the objective task are usu-
ally assessed in a control experiment separately from the main
experiment. During such a control experiment, the observer is
typically instructed to perform a task on a suppressed stimulus
across consecutive trials and in the absence of feedback. If CFS
is indeed successful at effectively suppressing the stimulus on a
majority of the trials, the observer will fail to detect the stimu-
lus over and over again, and there is evidence that this can lead
to an underestimation of the observer’s true performance levels.
For example, one study compared detection of a masked stimu-
lus under two conditions (Pratte and Rouder, 2009; see also Lin
and Murray, 2014). One condition consisted exclusively of tri-
als involving this masked stimulus, whereas the other condition
also included trials where the stimulus was perceptually visible.
In this second condition, observers could reliably detect masked
stimuli, but in the ﬁrst condition, detection performance was at
chance level for those same stimuli, arguably because an inability
to detect the stimulus on a large proportion of the trials caused
inattention or lack of motivation. Similar effects of impaired per-
formance have been observed in visual search experiments where
only small a minority of trials contains an actual target (Wolfe
et al., 2007).
Aside from this issue of inattention or lack of motivation,
two other factors can limit the extent to which awareness mea-
sures obtained in a control experiment may not generalize to
the main experiment. First, given that the two experiments typ-
ically involve different behavioral tasks, observers’ strategies are
likely to differ in time, potentially leading to differences in aware-
ness (Reingold and Merikle, 1988). Second, perceptual sensitivity
and response criteria may vary over time due to adaptation,
fatigue or training, disqualifying any techniques that do not
allow one to separate this variation from the measure of inter-
est (e.g., Purcell et al., 1983). We should add that these concerns
about testing for awareness outside of the main experiment apply
with equal force to situations in which awareness measures are
obtained from observers different from those tested in the main
experiment (Bahrami et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2011; Troiani and
Schultz, 2013). Indeed, we see no justiﬁcation for doing this. The
strength of interocular suppression differs considerably among
observers; a CFS mask of given contrast may render a dichop-
tically viewed target completely undetectable for one observer,
but for another observer this same CFS mask may prove rela-
tively weak in terms of suppressing a target (Yang et al., 2010a;
Zadbood et al., 2011). Despite CFS’s reputation for producing
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potent suppression, individual differences do exist and they could
substantially impact the inﬂuence of other factors modulating
awareness.
Our ﬁnal concern about objective awareness measures dur-
ing CFS relates to the point we raised above when discussing
subjective awareness measures, and the concern centers on the
possibility of partial visibility. When sensory signals are weak
or degraded but, at minimal, detectable, observers may fail
to consciously access information at different levels of pro-
cessing and thus different representational levels (Kouider and
Dupoux, 2004; Kouider et al., 2010). In the context of objec-
tive measures, an observer’s awareness is commonly indexed by
his or her ability to discriminate between two alternatives in
a categorization task on the suppressed stimulus. For instance,
an observer may be asked to report whether the stimulus is
a tool or an animal (Almeida et al., 2008, 2010). Classify-
ing an image into categories such as these plausibly requires
more information than does merely detecting the presence of
that image. If a stimulus becomes partially visible, therefore,
the situation is similar to the one we described above when
discussing subjective awareness measures. Speciﬁcally, partial
visibility may not be sufﬁcient for performing the classiﬁca-
tion task used to index awareness, but it may nevertheless
inﬂuence the independent measure (e.g., priming, adaptation)
investigated by the study at hand. In support of this notion,
Mudrik et al. (2013) demonstrated that a face suppressed with
CFS caused priming when using chance performance on a
face identiﬁcation task as the criterion for including data, but
this priming disappeared when the authors instead selected
data on the basis of a more stringent location discrimination
task.
We will conclude this section with the general note that
there is probably no single, foolproof index of awareness. For
instance, in the case of “blindsight” subjective and objective
measures of awareness conﬂict with one another. Here corti-
cally lesioned patients deny having any subjective awareness of
visual stimuli but can successfully perform objective tasks on
those stimuli (e.g., Sahraie et al., 1997; Stoerig and Cowey, 1997;
de Gelder et al., 2008). There is evidence for similar dissoci-
ations in healthy individuals as well (Kolb and Braun, 1995;
Lau and Passingham, 2006). Objective and subjective measures
of awareness are not only dissociable at the behavioral level,
as Hesselmann et al. (2011) have demonstrated. These authors
employed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while
observers made objective and subjective reports of stimuli sup-
pressed with CFS. Areas beyond early visual cortex were strongly
responsive to trials in which observers subjectively reported seeing
the “suppressed” stimulus, whereas objective performance on a
location discrimination task was correlated with multivariate pat-
tern classiﬁcation performance using responses from early visual
areas.
Recommendations
Based on the considerations detailed above, we come to the
following suggestions for a “best practice” approach to measur-
ing the degree of awareness of the suppressed stimulus in CFS
experiments.
It should be clear from the above that each awareness measure
has its own shortcomings, and also that different awareness mea-
sures plausibly index different stages of awareness. This leads to
two recommendations. First, it is reasonable to employ multiple
measures of awareness side by side, to obtain a more complete
assessment of observers’ perceptual state under CFS (Sterzer et al.,
2008; Kang et al., 2011; Kaunitz et al., 2011b; Yokoyama et al.,
2013). Second, it is advisable to be cautious in generalizing ﬁnd-
ings obtained using one criterion of unawareness, to situations
that employ other measures.
Emerging from the considerations raised in this section is
a common theme: the transition from complete awareness to
unawareness is not abrupt but, instead, unfolds in a graded fash-
ion. With regard to subjective measures of awareness, this means
that it is advisable to use report scales with multiple levels, rather
than dichotomous ones, to obtain more certainty that awareness
was, in fact, lacking in conditions labeled as “unaware.” To illus-
trate this point, studies by Overgaard et al. (2013) have shown
that subliminal perceptual effects using a dichotomous measure
were no longer observed when executing the same experimen-
tal paradigm with the PAS graded report scale. With regard to
objective measures, the graded nature of awareness during CFS
means that asking observers to cast a verdict about relatively
complex stimulus aspects (e.g., semantic category) invites the pos-
sibility of overlooking their awareness of basic stimulus features
insufﬁcient to perform that task. In other words, it is preferable
to ask observers to perform a task on basic stimulus features,
instead.
We mentioned the statistical concern that has been raised with
regard to objective awareness measures, of falsely accepting the
null hypothesis when objective performance does not signiﬁcantly
differ from chance. When aiming to substantiate an unawareness
claim using objective measures, it would be a good idea to per-
form some type of power analysis to minimize a Type II error. For
instance, one can use a method involving equivalence conﬁdence
intervals (Berger andHsu, 1996; Overgaard et al., 2013), where one
identiﬁes the range of potential values of the dependent variable
that would be statistically indistinguishable from chance perfor-
mance, and then evaluates whether both the lower and upper
conﬁdence intervals around the observed variable lie within this
range.
As a ﬁnal recommendation, we pointed out concerns that arise
when measuring awareness in an experiment separate from the
main one, and the best way to sidestep those concerns is to include
the awareness condition within the main experiment. A good
example of such an approach was offered by Faivre et al. (2012).
Within a single experiment, these authors randomly intermixed
trials that required an awareness judgment and ones where the
main task was required. Observers were not informed until the
end of a trial which kind of trial it was, thus guaranteeing a simi-
lar attitude in terms of attention and motivation across both trial
types. In situations where it is infeasible to obtain visibility mea-
sures within the main experiment, it is useful to at least employ a
maximally similar paradigm and task set across both experiments
(Reingold and Merikle, 1988) and, ideally, to assess awareness both
prior to the main experiment and afterward (e.g., see Jiang and He,
2006; Kang et al., 2011).
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WHAT ARE EFFECTIVE METHODS FOR GAGING THE SPECIFICITY AND
STRENGTH OF STIMULUS PROCESSING OUTSIDE OF AWARENESS?
A common approach when investigating stimulus processing out-
side of awareness with CFS is to contrast a given measure in
the presence of interocular suppression against that measure in
absence of interocular suppression. In priming and adaptation
paradigms, these measures tend to map onto conditions where
stimuli are visible or invisible owing to CFS. In b-CFS, these
measures are typically represented by conditions in which stimuli
gradually become visible as a result of either emergence from sup-
pression or some type of stimulus manipulation such as contrast
ramping. The comparison of stimulus-driven effects in the pres-
ence and absence of interocular suppression allows investigators
to index the relative strength and speciﬁcity of stimulus processes
engaged without an observer’s awareness. Take binocular rivalry,
for instance, where one can directly compare a stimulus-driven
effect when that stimulus is perceptually dominant as opposed
to when it is suppressed during rivalry while all other aspects of
the stimuli and procedures remain unchanged. This particular
approach of holding all conditions identical with the sole excep-
tion of an observer’s awareness is rather difﬁcult when using CFS,
because stimuli are so infrequently and incompletely perceived in
the presence of a potent CFS mask. Thus, here CFS’s extreme effec-
tiveness for rendering stimuli invisible becomes, paradoxically, a
potential drawback. Indeed, this may explain why so many CFS
studies that use a priming paradigm choose not to include a visible
condition at all: priming effects known to exist based on previous
research using visible stimuli were only assessed using prime stim-
uli rendered invisible by CFS (Almeida et al., 2008, 2010, 2013;
Anderson et al., 2012; Faivre et al., 2012; Sakuraba et al., 2012;
Zabelina et al., 2013). In these studies, evidence for priming despite
CFS is revealing, particularly when the strength of these subliminal
priming effects varies across stimulus categories (e.g., tools versus
faces). Still, it remains unclear whether primingwithout awareness
is different in magnitude relative to priming with visible stimuli.
Many other CFS studies with priming and adaptation
paradigms do include a no-suppression condition, but the potency
of CFS often forces researchers to speciﬁcally design that condition
rather than simply wait for the target stimulus to break through
suppression and become visible (for exceptions see Adams et al.,
2010; Stein and Sterzer, 2011; Stein et al., 2012a). Next we turn
to such CFS studies that do include a no-suppression condition.
We will dedicate a separate section of this discussion to paradigms
that involve the target stimulus b-CFS, because the choice of the
no-suppression condition turns out to be particularly important
in those paradigms.
General concerns regarding no-suppression conditions in CFS
paradigms
For the no-suppression condition of many physiological and
behavioral studies, the CFS mask was simply removed altogether,
thereby leaving the monocular stimulus viewed by the other eye
easily visible (e.g., Kanai et al., 2006; Yang et al., 2010b; Amihai
et al., 2011; Sweeny et al., 2011; Sklar et al., 2012). One potential
drawback to this kind of monocular condition is that measures of
stimulus-driven effects with the monocularly visible stimulus may
be inﬂated, since removing the CFS mask may also eliminate a
large source of external noise. Moreover, removal of the CFS mask
may well inﬂuence the extent to which contrast normalization
inﬂuences the effective contrast of the combined left- and right-
eye neural signals independent of interocular suppression (e.g.,
Ding and Sperling, 2006; Said and Heeger, 2013). Consistent with
these concerns, some pivotal conclusions based on fMRI results
obtained using CFS in combination with a no-mask comparison
condition (Fang and He, 2005; Jiang and He, 2006; Sterzer et al.,
2008; Vizueta et al., 2011) were not reached in studies where CFS
masks were included and matched across experimental conditions
(Hesselmann and Malach, 2011; Hesselmann et al., 2011).
No-suppression conditions in b-CFS paradigms
As brieﬂy discussed above, the b-CFS paradigm, unlike other
paradigms used with CFS, aims to infer processing of a target
stimulus that is suppressed from awareness, by measuring at
which moment this suppression ends and the observer becomes
aware of that same stimulus (e.g., Jiang et al., 2007; Stein et al.,
2011b). In other words, the paradigm, by design, operates right
on the border between awareness and unawareness. The same
is not true for paradigms involving, say, adaptation or priming,
which index processing outside of awareness in terms of detec-
tion or performance in a separate task. Just to review, the logic
of the b-CFS paradigm entails comparing the RT at which an
initially suppressed target stimulus is ﬁrst detected as it emerges
from CFS. When different classes of stimuli show signiﬁcantly
different detection RTs, one presumes that those stimulus cate-
gories were differentially processed while suppressed, with faster
RTs implying more robust processing outside of awareness. For
instance, emotional faces are detected faster than their neu-
tral counterparts as they emerge from CFS (Yang et al., 2007;
Tsuchiya et al., 2009; Gray et al., 2010; Sterzer et al., 2011; Stein
and Sterzer, 2012; Stein et al., 2014). However, given the char-
acteristic of the b-CFS paradigm of relying on responses made
when the target stimulus is not suppressed, one needs to be cau-
tious ascribing RT differences to differences in processing outside
of awareness. For instance, RT may also be modulated by fac-
tors such as general detection ability, response criteria, and basic
visual attributes. Ruling out such alternative explanations means
that the choice of no-suppression condition is critical, as detailed
below.
Alternative explanations to processing outside of awareness can
be rejected by demonstrating that RT differences found between
two stimulus conditions using the b-CFS procedure disappear
when interocular suppression is removed from the picture. The
no-suppression condition that is required to demonstrate this
should ideally engage all the processes that occur in the invis-
ible condition, with the exception of those that render stimuli
invisible (Stein et al., 2011b). In one popular no-suppression
condition, the target stimulus is blended into the CFS mask
itself so that both target and CFS mask are seen by the same
eye, rather than having the target imaged in the eye not view-
ing the CFS mask, as in the invisible condition (e.g., Costello
et al., 2009; Yang and Yeh, 2010; Mudrik et al., 2011; Stein and
Sterzer, 2012; Stewart et al., 2012). The blending is implemented
so that the target stimulus gradually emerges within the CFS mask
during the trial, to perceptually mimic that stimulus emerging
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from suppression (but see Stein et al., 2011b). As we will discuss
next, this approach comes with several subtleties and potential
pitfalls.
A primary concern with this kind of “blended”condition is that
the resulting RT distribution is almost always signiﬁcantly differ-
ent from the RT distribution found for the invisible condition.
Most notably, in the no-suppression condition RTs are typically
faster and less variable than they are in the invisible condition.
The reduced variability, in particular, can be a cause for concern.
For instance, a small RT range suggests that the target stim-
uli may be transitioning from unnoticeable to noticeable rather
abruptly. As a result, even if observers do reach decisions about
the presence of different stimulus categories at different rates in
the blended condition, those differences may be obscured by ﬂoor
effects that mask decisional inﬂuences (e.g., response criterion),
which are more evident in the longer RTs measured in the invisible
condition.
Another aspect of the relatively small RT variability in the no-
suppression condition is related to the fact that the ramping rate
typically remains ﬁxed across trials. This constant rate means that
observers can develop strong expectancy effects for this condi-
tion, effects that are precluded in the invisible conditions by the
temporal uncertainty engendered by the more variable durations
of suppression. Any differences in expectation between the no-
suppression condition and the invisible condition may also lead
to differences in observer’s response strategies, and these differ-
ences are further exacerbated when no-suppression and invisible
trials are presented in separate blocks, as often done in CFS studies
(Stein et al., 2011b).
Recommendations
For certain CFS designs involving measures such as adaptation
and priming, the concerns expressed above make it unwise to
compare CFS conditions to conditions without any mask whatso-
ever. If the CFS masks are truly potent, only a small percentage
of trials will fail to produce reliable suppression. It is then pos-
sible, with some adaptation paradigms, to compare trials with
CFS masks in which suppression succeeded to those in which
suppression failed (Adams et al., 2010; Stein and Sterzer, 2011;
Stein et al., 2012a). One potential drawback is that it may be
laborious to acquire a sufﬁcient number of no-suppression tri-
als. Alternatively, one should try to tone down the CFS mask to
allow periods where the target stimulus becomes unequivocally
visible. Then, periods of suppression and periods of visibility can
be compared, all in the presence of a CFS mask. Some studies
have taken steps in this direction, and measured the stimulus con-
ditions that produced reliable suppression for each participant,
prior to the main task. In doing so, those studies were able to
distinguish stimulus conditions (e.g., contrast values) that differ-
ent levels of stimulus awareness in the presence of the CFS mask
(e.g., Tsuchiya andKoch,2005; Hesselmann et al., 2011; Kang et al.,
2011; Kaunitz et al., 2011b). While more time consuming,measur-
ing CFS under these graded visibility conditions provides a more
complete picture of the impact of CFS and visibility. Moreover,
conditions with different degrees of visibility in this design may
also be more comparable in terms of detectability and attentional
engagement.
As for the b-CFS paradigm, there are several improvements
in the no-suppression condition that could be implemented. To
minimize differences in RT distributions across no-suppression
and invisible conditions, the rate at which a stimulus increases in
luminance or contrast during a no-suppression trial can be varied
to produce RT distributions similar to those measured in the invis-
ible condition (e.g., Stein et al., 2011b, 2012b). After successfully
matching RT distributions across conditions with this and related
methods, Stein et al. (2011b) found that one differential stimulus
effect – the face inversion effect – produced under the invisible
condition was observed in the no-suppression condition as well.
To circumvent effects attributed to differences in anticipation
and response strategies, it is advisable for no-suppression and
invisible trials to be randomly intermixed and, when possible, for
response accuracy to be measured rather than RT (Stein et al.,
2011b). In fact, this suggestion is applicable to all techniques
using CFS. In addition to intermixing no-suppression and invis-
ible trials, varying stimulus onset in both no-suppression and
invisible conditions can further reduce differences in temporal
uncertainty and minimize anticipation effects in no-suppression
trials (Sterzer et al., 2011; Stein and Sterzer, 2012; Gayet et al.,
2013). Explicitlymodeling response bias or decision criterion (e.g.,
diffusion models by Smith and Ratcliff, 2004) can at least disso-
ciate RT effects driven by bias in stimulus processing from those
driven by more post-perceptual, cognitive (e.g., decision making)
processes.
Putting aside, for now, the methodological challenges asso-
ciated with designing a no-suppression condition for b-CFS, we
would like to conclude with a conceptual point. Many studies
using b-CFS have now reported stimulus factors that inﬂuence the
time it takes to report an initially suppressed stimulus. Indeed,
such effects have been reported for a broad range of stimulus cat-
egories, including words, scenes and faces. True to the logic of
no-suppression conditions outlined above, these same studies did
not ﬁnd the same effects on RT when the stimuli were not sup-
pressed, indicating the speciﬁc involvement of processes outside
of awareness. This remarkable situation raises the question why
preferential processing should occur only in the absence of aware-
ness, and why the same mechanisms that affect processing outside
of awareness would not inﬂuence conscious processing as well.
One possibility is that similar inﬂuences do affect conscious pro-
cessing as well, but that these inﬂuences can remain undetected
for methodological reasons such as the ones outlined above. For
instance, early studies have reported shorter RTs for upright faces
than for inverted faces during b-CFS but not during visible con-
trol conditions, yet more recent work has shown similar effects
for visible conditions as well (Stein et al., 2011b). The more fun-
damental question, however, is this: what kind of processes are
we left with when comparing a b-CFS condition with an ideal
control condition that is matched in everything but interocular
suppression?
As a ﬁnal methodological suggestion for all CFS paradigms we
would like to point to an approach in the literature that has not
yet been used in combination with CFS, but whose properties
may enable this approach to circumvent some concerns associated
with no-suppression conditions. This type of approach, tradi-
tionally known as the process-dissociation method, capitalizes
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on experimental measures that differ qualitatively in awareness
(Marcel, 1983; Cheesman and Merikle, 1986; Jacoby, 1991). This
relies on the notion that awareness allows observers to inten-
tionally act on information provided by the stimulus, yet that
the absence of awareness leads to more automatic reactions to
stimulus information that observers cannot intentionally control
(Merikle et al., 2001). In a classic example (Debner and Jacoby,
1994; Merikle et al., 1995), an image of a word is perceptually
masked and then followed by an image containing the ﬁrst three
letters of that same word. Observers’ instructions are to complete
the word stem with the ﬁrst word that came to mind excluding
the word that was previously presented. If the previous word was
effectively masked, observers are more likely to recall that word
when ﬁlling in the word stem (i.e., priming effect). However, if
the word was visible to observers, they should be able to prevent
themselves from using that word. While some concerns have been
raised with this particular example (e.g., Fisk and Haase, 2007),
there are several other circumstances that can generate qualita-
tively different effects based on stimulus visibility (e.g., Murphy
and Zajonc, 1993; Merikle and Joordens, 1997).
WHAT ARE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE ROBUSTNESS OF
STIMULUS-DRIVEN EFFECTS UNDER CFS?
Attention
While the relationship between attention and awareness remains
controversial, there is growing consensus that that attention and
awareness can to some extent be dissociated (reviews by Koch and
Tsuchiya, 2007; van Boxtel et al., 2010a; but Cohen et al., 2012).
For instance, lines of research that we will discuss below, sug-
gest that (1) attention can be involuntarily drawn to the location
of a stimulus suppressed by CFS, and (2) that attention volun-
tarily directed toward the location or features of a suppressed
stimulus can signiﬁcantly diminish the extent to which process-
ing of that stimulus is impacted by CFS suppression. While both
these notions indicate that CFS suppression and inattention can
be separated, the second notion suggests something else as well.
Speciﬁcally, under the reasonable assumption that observers in
standard CFS designs are inclined to pay less attention to the loca-
tion and features of a target stimulus once they can no longer
see the stimulus due to suppression, this second notion leads us
to ask whether the reduction in neural processing that is often
observed for a suppressed stimulus may, in part, be due to lack
of attention to that stimulus. Incidentally, a related issue has been
the center of a long-standing debate involving affective priming
by stimuli rendered invisible using backward masking (reviews
by Pessoa, 2005; Bishop, 2008). Early studies reported sublimi-
nal priming effects with and neural responses to affective stimuli
rendered invisible with backward masking, pointing to affective
processing outside of awareness (e.g., Morris et al., 1998; Whalen
et al., 2004). However, recent studies have demonstrated that these
effects disappear when attention is sufﬁciently allocated away from
affective stimuli, suggesting that affective processing outside of
awareness is conditional upon attentionmechanisms (e.g., Phillips
et al., 2004; Kouider et al., 2009). In the following section, we will
discuss studies of attention manipulations during CFS, as well as
their relevance for work examining visual processing under CFS
suppression.
First, attention can be involuntarily drawn to the location of
a stimulus suppressed by CFS. Speciﬁcally, certain categories of
stimuli, such as arousing images (Jiang et al., 2006) and emotional
facial expressions (Yang et al., 2011), have been shown to attract
observers’ attention toward the location of those stimuli, even
when they are suppressed from awareness with CFS. As a conse-
quence, these invisible stimuli either facilitate or hinder observers’
responses to subsequent visible stimuli, which are presented in
corresponding or opposing spatial locations. In a related ﬁnd-
ing, a search task involving a target that was suppressed using
CFS revealed that the eyes ﬁxated longer on the location of the
target, even though it remained unperceived (Rothkirch et al.,
2012). There is also evidence that stimuli such as suppressed faces
with averted gaze can cue observers’ endogenous spatial atten-
tion (Xu et al., 2011). Interestingly, similar ﬁndings have not
been reported with binocular rivalry, as suppressed visual cues
failed to inﬂuence observers’ spatial attention in a related design
(Schall et al., 1993).
Second, attention voluntarily directed to an invisible stimulus
can strongly increase the extent to which that stimulus is processed
outside of awareness. Speciﬁcally, when an observer’s spatial or
feature-based attention is purposely directed at an invisible stim-
ulus, the effective strength of that visual stimulus is enhanced, as
evidenced by the stronger visual aftereffects it induces despite its
invisibility (Kanai et al., 2006; Shin et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2010b).
Conversely, these aftereffects are substantially weakened, if not
abolished, if attention is purposely removed from the suppressed
stimulus (Bahrami et al., 2008; Shin et al., 2009; Kaunitz et al.,
2011a). In other words, directing attention to the location or
to the features of an invisible stimulus modulates the degree to
which that stimulus is processed outside of awareness. Physio-
logical support for this notion comes from studies showing that
attention allocation and attentional load directly modulate fMRI
BOLD responses to stimuli suppressed from awareness by CFS
(Bahrami et al., 2007; Watanabe et al., 2011; Yuval-Greenberg and
Heeger, 2013). One possible role of attention outside of aware-
ness is to temporarily bind the encoded features of an invisible
stimulus to create high-level representations that guide behav-
ioral and perceptual processes outside of awareness (Lin and He,
2009).
In summary, attention may modulate the extent of visual pro-
cessing under suppression, successfully boosting or weakening
neural signals arising from the suppressed stimulus. Consider-
ing that inattention to a stimulus is a common, but apparently not
necessary, concomitant of perceptually suppressing that stimulus,
this observation is important for CFS studies that report reduced
or abolished stimulus-driven effects under CFS. Rather than con-
cluding that those effects are modulated by awareness alone, one
needs to consider the possibility that they are, at least in part,
modulated by attention. To give an illustrative example, one topic
that calls for such a cautious attitude is the topic of high-level
aftereffects induced by stimuli under CFS. Both complex motion
aftereffects (Maruya et al., 2008; Kaunitz et al., 2011a) and vari-
ous face aftereffects (Shin et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2010b; Amihai
et al., 2011; Stein and Sterzer, 2011) can be fully erased by CFS
suppression of the inducing stimulus, yet this can to some extent
be prevented by making sure the observer keeps attending to the
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location of the suppressed stimulus (Shin et al., 2009; Yang et al.,
2010b; Kaunitz et al., 2011a).
Feature-selective suppression
Many studies of binocular rivalry show that interocular suppres-
sion adversely impacts visibility for a broad range of stimuli
presented under suppression. Nearly all rivalry studies involv-
ing detection or discrimination of test probes have shown that
an observer’s ability to perceive a wide range of visual features
is signiﬁcantly impaired when probes are presented during inte-
rocular suppression, including probes that differ greatly from
the currently suppressed target (review by Blake, 2001). It was
that pattern of results that led to the characterization of inte-
rocular rivalry suppression as non-selective, meaning all classes
of visual input are affected, to some extent, when presented
under suppression (review by Blake and Logothetis, 2002). This
view of suppression dovetails with other ﬁndings suggesting
that interocular suppression works by reducing effective stimu-
lus contrast or contrast gain of stimulus-evoked responses within
early stages of visual processing (Watanabe et al., 2004; Tsuchiya
et al., 2006; Yuval-Greenberg and Heeger, 2013). However, this
is only half of the story, for there is also evidence for an addi-
tional selective component to interocular suppression (Stuit et al.,
2009). In the following paragraphs, we review evidence for selec-
tivity obtained using the CFS technique to induce interocular
suppression.
Several lines of evidence suggest that processing of some classes
of stimuli is less adversely impacted by suppression than is process-
ing of others when CFS is used to induce interocular suppression.
For instance, neural processing of objects that fall within cate-
gories such as tools and emotional faces appears less susceptible
to CFS than is neural processing of stimuli in animal, vehi-
cle, and neutral face categories, as evidenced by the stronger
stimulus-induced effects produced by tools and emotional faces
under suppression. In this sense, interocular suppression pro-
duced by CFS selectively attenuates or abolishes certain signals
while leaving others to be potentially encoded during suppression.
However, the underlying mechanism for such selective suppres-
sion is unclear. Lin and He (2009) proposed a framework in
which some critical stimulus features can be registered under
CFS, with the degree to which this happens dependent on the
type of visual input. Speciﬁcally, suppression, in this view, is
strongest within functionally specialized areas that comprise the
ventral visual pathway, areas in which activity is thought to corre-
late strongly with object representations (e.g., Rees et al., 2002).
In contrast, areas that are relatively unperturbed by CFS may
be those comprising the dorsal visual pathway (Fang and He,
2005), as well as the subcortical pathways, presumably more prim-
itive neural circuitry in evolutionary terms and responsible for
registering ecologically relevant information including affective
content (Morris et al., 1998; Jiang and He, 2006). Lin and He’s
view is consistent with popular theories supporting the functional
signiﬁcance of dorsal visual and subcortical affective pathways
in guiding behavior outside of awareness (e.g., Goodale et al.,
1991; Ohman and Mineka, 2001). At the same time, however,
evidence consistent with this dorsal/ventral distinction has been
challenged by several recent studies demonstrating the importance
of feature-based encoding during CFS. These studies are discussed
below.
The apparent dissociation in dorsal and ventral stream process-
ing under CFS is primarily supported by reports of object-selective
processing of tool images, which are presumably registered within
the dorsal stream (Fang and He, 2005; Almeida et al., 2008, 2010).
Almeida et al. (2008, 2010) ﬁrst showed category-related prim-
ing effects that were speciﬁc to images of tools. However, those
investigators did not take into account that, unlike other object cat-
egories tested (i.e., animals), tools tend to be elongated in shape,
and Sakuraba et al. (2012) later demonstrated that this may be
an important factor. Speciﬁcally, these latter authors argued that
tool-selective priming with CFS was more likely attributable to
the encoding of object shape rather than object category, based
on their ﬁnding that elongated non-tool objects elicited equiva-
lent priming effects whereas non-elongated tools failed to produce
any priming (see also Kaunitz et al., 2011b). In addition, physio-
logical evidence for preferential encoding of tools in dorsal areas
under CFS (Fang and He, 2005) has not been replicated when
CFS displays were presented in both visible and invisible condi-
tions (Hesselmann and Malach, 2011; Hesselmann et al., 2011).
Exclusion of the CFS mask in the visible condition may make
it difﬁcult to dissociate responses linked to differences in stim-
ulus awareness and those related to discrepancies in stimulus
conditions.
The subcortical hypothesis for emotion processing posits that
threat-related stimuli are prioritized during stimulus processing
that may occur pre-attentively and outside of awareness (review by
Phelps and LeDoux, 2005). This theory has been supported byCFS
studies demonstrating that fearful face stimuli evoke greater neural
responses and break suppression faster than other emotional and
neutral face stimuli during CFS (Jiang and He, 2006; Yang et al.,
2007; Jiang et al., 2009; Sterzer et al., 2011; Gray et al., 2013; Troiani
and Schultz, 2013; Stein et al., 2014). However, a series of recent
behavioral studies have shown that this advantage in breaking sup-
pression may not be attributed to the emotional content of fearful
faces and may not speciﬁcally involve the subcortical pathway. For
instance, Gray et al. (2013) demonstrated a similar advantage in
breaking suppression for face stimuli that were identical in several
low-level visual properties as fearful faces (i.e., spatial frequency,
contrast) but were not explicitly or implicitly recognized as fearful
in expression. This study thus suggests that the rapid detection of
fearful faces may be attributed to properties other than emotional
content. In addition, Stein et al. (2014) showed that this fear-based
advantage is modulated by differences in high rather than low spa-
tial frequency content across emotional expressions (see also Stein
and Sterzer, 2012), which is consistent with a recent study show-
ing that high spatial frequency content is less susceptible to CFS
suppression than low spatial frequency content (Yang and Blake,
2012). The Stein et al. (2014) study does not implicate the sub-
cortical pathway since it is thought that this route predominantly
conveys coarse low spatial frequency information of threat-related
stimuli to the amygdala (Vuilleumier et al., 2003). An additional
piece of evidence against the involvement of the amygdala is that
patients with bilateral or unilateral lesions to the amygdala show
an intact fearful face advantage during CFS (Tsuchiya et al., 2009;
Yang et al., 2012; see also Willenbockel et al., 2012).
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 724 | 11
Yang et al. Visual processing with CFS
In summary, differential processing of low-level features likely
played a larger role than originally anticipated in several studies
using CFS, contributing to the impression that particular routes
of visual processing were relatively unaffected by CFS.
Differential suppression of low-level features. Several studies
mentioned above underscore the inﬂuence of low-level stimulus
properties in stimulus-driven effects obtained under CFS sup-
pression. In this context it is important to note that interocular
suppression may differentially affect the encoding of different
low-level features. Speciﬁcally, studies using binocular rivalry
(e.g., Yang et al., 1992; Alais and Parker, 2006; Alais and Melcher,
2007), dichoptic masking (e.g., Baker and Meese, 2007) and more
recently CFS (Hong and Blake, 2009; Zadbood et al., 2011; Yang
and Blake, 2012) have demonstrated that stimulus features most
strongly suppressed are those that are shared with the stimu-
lus that induces suppression, or the “suppressor.” Recent work
shows that this general pattern also applies to the Mondrian-like
CFS display that was introduced by Tsuchiya and Koch (2005),
and that is the most popular version of CFS display currently
in use. Yang and Blake (2012) demonstrated that the features
most strongly suppressed by Mondrian patterns are low spatial
frequencies and cardinal orientations, which also happen to be
the most prominent features of the Mondrian patterns themselves
(see also Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005). Furthermore, altering the
spatiotemporal properties of the Mondrian patterns also altered
the pattern of suppression, such that stimulus features shared by
the suppressor were nearly always the ones most strongly sup-
pressed. Stein et al. (2014) found a similar pattern of results
with face stimuli and CFS patterns that were varied in spatial
frequency content. These investigators also examined suppres-
sion with CFS displays that were equivalent in energy across
low and high spatial frequency bands. However, suppression
remained biased toward low spatial frequency faces even with
these ﬁltered displays, and this may be partly attributable to the
temporal structure of CFS displays (Yang and Blake, 2012). Other
characteristics of CFS using Mondrian displays, include differ-
ential suppression of chromatic and achromatic content (Hong
and Blake, 2009) and differential suppression of temporal and
form information (Zadbood et al., 2011). Finally, the pattern of
feature-selective suppression demonstrated with the Mondrian
display may generalize to other CFS displays previously used,
since Yang and Blake showed that these tend to have spectral
proﬁles similar to that of the Mondrian display (Supplemen-
tary Figure 1 in Yang and Blake, 2012). It may be this particular
spectral proﬁle that leads to the potent suppression evoked by
CFS.
Considered together, the processing of a stimulus under CFS
will be adversely impacted in general (non-selective suppression)
but to an extent that depends on the similarity between that stim-
ulus and the stimulus doing the suppression [feature-selective
suppression, similar to that described by Stuit et al. (2009), for
conventional binocular rivalry]. This is important for at least two
reasons. First, weakly suppressed stimulus features are more likely
to be visible to observers but experimenters may fail to detect
observers’ awareness of them (see section above). As a result, visi-
ble stimulus fragments may modulate stimulus-driven effects that
are mistakenly attributed to processing outside of awareness. Sec-
ond, even for fully suppressed stimuli, information processing
under CFS is determined, in part, by differences in the extent
to which basic visual features are impacted by CFS. These two
notions are important for studies in which stimulus-driven effects
are attributed to encoding of high-level, semantic information
during CFS (review by Lin and He, 2009), and in particular when
experimenters use stimuli whose similarity in basic visual features
is larger within the same semantic category than it is between cat-
egories (Kouider and Dehaene, 2007). Especially when selective
feature encoding is paired with factors such as small stimulus sets
and high rates of stimulus repetition across trials, feature-selective
suppression may play a large role in stimulus-driven effects under
CFS. In sum, the differential impact of CFS on low-level stimu-
lus features must be considered as an alternative explanation for
ﬁndings that might otherwise be attributed to high-level visual
processing under CFS. Conversely, one may get some idea of
the extent to which various later stages of analysis could still
function under CFS by considering the extent to which CFS selec-
tively inhibits the basic visual signals that provide input to those
stages.
General recommendations
We recommend that observers’ attentional state be carefully con-
trolled during tasks involving CFS. For example, attention can be
cued to the location of the suppressed stimulus to maximize visual
processing under suppression. Importantly, when select visual
processes are hypothesized as being engaged automatically or in
the absence of awareness, it should be made explicit whether these
processes are also independent of observers’ attentional engage-
ment. One common approach to examining the role of attention
in visual processing outside of awareness is to compare the strength
of stimulus-driven effects under conditions where attention is
directed toward versus away from suppressed target stimuli.
To avoid the potential effects of feature-selective suppression
described above, we recommend that experimenters select tar-
get images that are similar in spatial composition (e.g., shape,
size) within and across stimulus categories or, better yet, cre-
ate images comprised of different phase spectra but identical
amplitude spectra using image processing techniques. Secondly,
certain spatial properties can be normalized across stimuli such
as spatial frequency amplitude, contrast, mean luminance, ori-
entation content, shape, and size. Finally, we recommend that
experimenters use CFS displays that are similar in spatial pro-
ﬁle as the target stimuli to be suppressed, in order to maximize
suppression of all components of the target stimulus. Alterna-
tively, one can manipulate stimuli to have similar spatial proﬁles
as the CFS display without necessarily altering stimulus recog-
nition. Based on previous studies (Hong and Blake, 2009; Yang
and Blake, 2012), achromatic Mondrian displays may prove to be
most effective at suppressing static, achromatic images composed
of low spatial frequency, cardinally oriented features. Consid-
ering that visible or weakly suppressed features may still occur,
one further measure one can take is to use large stimulus sets
or to replicate ﬁndings with multiple stimulus sets, to mini-
mize learned associations or effects of stimulus repetition across
trials.
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CONCLUSION
Those of us interested in visual processing outside of awareness
have at our disposal an impressive array of tools for manipulating
visual awareness. Among those tools, CFS is particularly appeal-
ing, since it offers several advantages compared to other techniques
at rendering stimuli invisible. Not surprisingly, the technique has
caught on within the ﬁeld, and the volume of results for process-
ing outside of awareness obtained with this technique is already
quite substantial despite the technique’s appearance on the scene
<10 years ago. Surveying studies that have employed CFS, one
sees several different ways in which CFS is being exploited, each
with its own subtleties that may inﬂuence the likelihood of ﬁnding
evidence for visual processing outside of awareness. Researchers
intending to use CFS will learn that multiple factors must be
taken into consideration when using this technique; we believe
the majority of those considerations can be grouped into four
primary questions. In this paper, we have provided recommenda-
tions for addressing those questions, and those recommendations
are brieﬂy reiterated below.
(1) What are suitable paradigms to use with CFS to study
processing outside of awareness?
• Measures of adaptation aftereffects are useful in examining
neural processes involved in the encoding of visual attributes
of a stimulus.
• Priming paradigms allow researchers to examine processing
of physical and conceptual (semantic) characteristics shared
by two stimuli.
• The b-CFS paradigm relies on the speed at which stimuli
emerge from suppression to infer the relative strength of
stimulus processing outside of awareness. This technique has
been widely used in examining semantic processes outside of
awareness.
(2) What are the optimal ways to determine whether a stimulus is
genuinely invisible?
• To obtain a more complete evaluation of observers’ percep-
tual state under CFS with adaptation or priming paradigms,
we advise the employment of multiple measures of aware-
ness, which include measures that assess different states of
awareness (i.e., objective, subjective) and measures that gage
different stages of stimulus analysis.
• We recommend the use of statistical analyses that reduce
the likelihood of falsely accepting the null hypothesis that
observers’ performance on an awareness measure is not sig-
niﬁcantly different from chance, with the implication that
stimuli were sufﬁciently rendered invisible.
• We urge that awareness measures be implemented within the
main experiment, and that those measures be administered
in ways that recreate, as nearly as possible, the attentional
state and response strategies engendered during the main
task when the target stimulus is putatively suppressed from
awareness by CFS.
(3) What are effective methods for gaging the speciﬁcity and
strength of stimulus processing outside of awareness?
• Studies should strive to compare stimulus-driven effects
found with CFS to those measured without suppression.
• The no-suppression condition(s) should be matched as
closely as possible to the invisible condition.
• We recommend that no-suppression and invisible trials
be randomly intermixed to minimize potential differences
between conditions (i.e., differences such as anticipation and
response strategy).
• For the b-CFS procedure, the no-suppression condition
should be individually tailored for each participant to pro-
duce similar RT distributions in the behavioral task and
similar perceptual experiences for the no-suppression and
invisible conditions.
(4) What are factors that inﬂuence the robustness of stimulus-
driven effects under CFS?
• The spatial location of an observer’s attentional engagement
can modulate visual processing under CFS. Thus:
◦ It is advisable to hold an observer’s spatial attention con-
stant across trials, particularly directing attention to the
locationof the stimulus being suppressed so as tomaximize
the likelihood of stimulus processing under CFS.
◦ Researchers should also consider manipulating an
observers’ spatial attention to test whether stimulus pro-
cessing is engaged without awareness and without atten-
tion.
• Low-level features of target stimulus and CFS display can
modulate the strength and selectivity of suppression.
◦ Target images should be closely matched in spatial com-
position with one another and with the CFS mask.
In closing, we are excited about the future opportunities for
learning more about stimulus processing outside of awareness,
and we are conﬁdent that CFS can provide one effective means
for pursuing that question. Coincidentally, the recent resurgence
of interest in processing outside of awareness coincides with the
forthcoming one-hundredth anniversary of the publication of one
of Sigmund Freud’s most famous essays, The Unconscious (Freud,
1915). For decades, Freud’s ideas have been construed as quaint
but outmoded, relying as they did on anecdote and scientiﬁcally
untestable conjecture. It is fair to say that Freud’s ideas about the
unconscious provided enjoyable literature but fell outside of the
domain of serious psychological science. Ironically, we now ﬁnd
ourselves armed with modern techniques like CFS for probing the
unconscious, and there appears to be a growing army of troops
enlisting to do just that. Our modest hope is that the concerns
about CFS and possible solutions we have voiced in this essay will
provide useful guidelines for strengthening the inferential poten-
tial of CFS. At the same time, we believe that CFS alone is not
going to provide a deﬁnitive answer to the question of processing
outside of awareness. Instead, we will need to use CFS in conjunc-
tion with other techniques for manipulating awareness (Kim and
Blake, 2005) to arrive at conclusions about stimulus processing
outside of awareness that are not method-speciﬁc.
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